Professor H. R. Waters, F.I.A., F.F.A. (introducing the paper): This paper had its origins within Heriot-Watt University about five years ago. At that time a new PhD student in the Department of Actuarial Mathematics and Statistics, Sheauwen Yang, came to see me to ask about possible topics for her research. I consulted Professor Wilkie, who said that it would be good if someone could do some research on guaranteed annuity options. This she did, and successfully presented her thesis for a PhD degree in the autumn of 2001. A copy of it is in the Faculty's Library. Our paper has developed from Dr Yang's thesis, but is not a summary of it.
There are many parallels between problems which arose in the 1990s in respect of guaranteed annuity options and the problems in the 1970s in respect of maturity guarantees. In the latter case, the United Kingdom profession established a Working Party chaired by Mr Alan Ford. Their report (Ford et al., 1980) set out a reserving methodology for policies with maturity guarantees. In early 1997 the Life Board set up a Working Party, chaired by Mr Michael Bolton, to consider the problem of reserving for policies with guaranteed annuity options (GAOs). This Working Party reported in late 1997 (Bolton et al., 1997) . Their report, which we have found to be an invaluable source of information for our own research, concludes with the following paragraph:
"We have considered whether it is possible to recommend an approach to reserving. However, the variation between products and between the approaches of different companies to managing the guarantees is so great that we have felt unable to do so."
In our paper we do try to set out a reserving methodology for GAOs, as well as discussing charging for these options. We actually discuss two slightly different approaches to reserving: firstly, quantile, or conditional tail expectation, reserves, which is comparable to the methodology proposed by the Maturity Guarantees Working Party in 1980; and, secondly, hedging, which is, in many ways, an attractive approach. However, it still requires additional reserves, possibly calculated as quantile reserves, to be set up, and there are practical reasons why we do not think that it could be adopted at the present time.
This paper concentrates on a very specific type of contract. We consider a single premium unit-linked policy which matures when the policyholder reaches age 65, and which must be used, at that time, to purchase an annuity in the open market or at a rate specified in the policy. The amount of work involved in considering different types of policy would be considerable, as Bolton et al. (1997) recognised. Nevertheless, we regard the general principles that we have set out with regard to charging and reserving for GAOs as applicable to other types of policy, for example annual premium and with-profits policies, and to those with different types of guarantee. We hope that this discussion will be restricted to technical issues and issues of principle, and will not extend to the specific details of policies issued by individual offices.
We apologise that the paper was not available, at least in hard copy form, until only a few days ago. It takes some time to read and absorb, and it took even longer to write.
Mr C. A. Speed, F.F.A. (opening the discussion):
We have an excellent paper that is thorough, thought provoking and highly relevant. I hope it will become an important reference in the development of the actuarial profession.
The paper takes an interesting approach by asking what 'informed up-to-date' actuaries should have been expected to know in 1985. Assuming that they applied their knowledge and continued to update their knowledge, what would the impact have been on the pricing and reserving of GAOs?
The start point of the paper is the methodology of the Maturity Guarantees Working Party Report (Ford et al., 1980) . The essence of this approach is to generate simulations and to ensure that there are sufficient reserves to meet the liabilities in all but a small percentage of scenarios. The discounted value of the benefit arising from the guarantee is calculated for 10,000 simulations and ranked. Then, for a security level, say 99%, the corresponding percentile is taken as the reserve. So, we have a reserve and a method of calculating it. The reserve needs to be financed. There are two obvious sources: shareholders and policyholders.
The policyholders contribute two types of charges to pay for the guarantees that they are receiving:
(1) the expectation of the discounted value of the benefit from the guarantee -they put in a charge to cover the present value of what they expect to get out; and (2) a charge to deliver an additional return to the shareholders on the capital that they put in.
The remaining amount to cover the reserve comes from shareholders.
Tables 2.5.1 and 2.5.3 give a feel for the magnitude of the reserves and charges at the end of 1984. A 30-year policy, based on a security level of 99%, requires a reserve of £21.08. If the additional return on shareholders' fund is to be 1%, then the total policyholder charge is £6.12. Remember, this is in addition to the £100 single premium. Even at the end of 1984 these are quite considerable numbers. Now that we have the framework established, I make a few comments:
(1) I find the requirement that the reserves are invested along with the policy funds restrictive, and a high price to pay for a mathematical nicety. If we think of a policy as it is about to mature, then there is a huge sensitivity to interest rates. If the interest rates are such that the market price annuity is 'at-the-money', any change of interest rates is going to flip the guarantee between having great value or no value. So, we have a policy which has great sensitivity to interest rates, and yet the reserves are invested in the unit fund (which is assumed to be equities), but provides no interest protection. However, this pre-empts a later part of the paper.
(2) In setting the security level, we have to make an arbitrary decision: should 99% or 99.9% or some other number be used? We do not know. Similarly, the additional return needed for the shareholders is an arbitrary number. These issues are recognised by the authors in Section 3, although the unsatisfactory conclusion is that it is a matter of 'judgement'. This sounds to me like a classic actuarial cop out for 'we do not know'.
(3) A more serious concern is whether the additional charge is required at all. Let us consider the shareholder's investment, and, for simplicity, assume deterministic mortality. The shareholder gets back his funds (rolled up by equity returns) in scenarios when the option matures and the guarantee does not bite: in other words, when bonds prices have been stable or fallen. The shareholder does not fare so well when bond prices rise and the guarantee bites. Indeed, if equity prices have also risen, the shareholder may have to put up further capital. We have in front of us an unusual asset. It performs well when bonds perform poorly, and performs poorly when bonds and equities perform well. Many investors consider such an asset valuable for managing risk. Some even go so far as purchasing derivatives for protection against falling asset prices, and finance this by giving away some of the upside. This is very similar to the shareholder's position in this example.
(4) I am also uncomfortable about setting the charge to the policyholder as the discounted value of the benefit from the guarantee. The charge incorporates the discount factor appropriate to equities, but is this the right discount factor? We know that pricing options using discounted payoffs is very tricky, and can lead to some surprising and unintuitive results. As an example: consider a one-year at the money equity option, assuming volatility of 20% and a risk-free rate of 5%. What discount do we need to recover the Black-Scholes price? The answer is 22.6%. It is totally nonobvious. The approach used to arrive at the first part of the policyholder charge seems akin to trying to price options by taking expectations of real world discounted values. I am unconvinced that it represents a good start point for charging policyholders.
Throughout the paper the authors use the Wilkie model, and they are candid concerning its shortcomings. The model has been around for quite a long time. For example, in ¶2.4.5 the possibility of a negative yield on Consols is discussed, and this is fixed by placing a lower bound of 0.5% on the Consols yield. The lower bound on the Consols yield is concerning, as, in the rare cases when this bites there are going to be very significant associated costs with the GAO. Other weaknesses relate to the lack of a full yield curve. True, the 1995 model provides short-term interest rates which allow for a yield curve to be constructed between the short rate and the Consols rate, but this curve is arbitrary, and is not a fit to market data. Further, the calibration of the model to historical data does not capture the information in the market at the start date of the projection. There could also be concerns that the autoregressive nature of the model maybe understates the probability of the option ending in the money. Given the importance of interest rates for valuing GAOs, I am slightly surprised that another model was not used. This comment may be slightly off the subject, because it concerns stochastic models rather than the main thrust of the paper.
The authors point out, in ¶2.2.3, that the actuary in 1985 should have been aware that the mortality tables PA(90) can be interpreted as a double entry table, allowing for improving mortality at the time. The reserves and charges are updated for each year up to the end of 2001, by which time the charge on a 30-year policy has grown from the 1985 value of £6.12 to £10.87. The initial reserve has increased from £21.08 to £32.68. Table 4 .3.1 shows the drift of the options to being 'in-the-money'. That is not surprising, given the development in mortality and interest rates. However, there is an important feature of that table; at all terms at the end of 1993 the options were in the money -the guarantees were due to bite -but then they all moved back out of the money in 1994. It seems that there were clear warnings for those who were able to read the signs. The paper then considers the impact of mortality tables since 1985. By the time we have reached 2001 using RMC92, the charge for our 30-year policy is £30.42, up from the original £6. The reserve for the 99% security level is £71.92 compared to £21. Figure 5 .4 is a good summary of what happens. We can see, following any particular mortality table, the increases in the reserve for the 99% security level. So, back in 1984 we would be looking at a reserve of about 11 or 12 units. At the end, the reserve has approximately doubled to about 24. So, we have a sizeable increase, but nothing compared to the jumps from changes in mortality tables. In other words, the changes in interest rates and the mortality improvements on a given mortality table are outweighed by the change to more recent mortality tables.
It is noticeable that
Is it sensible to stick with our intuition? On reflection, yes. The autoregressive nature of the Wilkie model will mean that initial conditions are of limited impact when projecting over very long periods, so the dominance of mortality does seem sensible. Surely this should be good news for the profession. I do not think that actuaries have exactly covered themselves in glory in managing interest rate risk, but, if the main driver is mortality, surely there is room for comfort. However, we have to look to our own experience and ask whether we were really on the ball. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many offices were not quick to adopt dual entry mortality tables, and, rather than make full allowance for mortality improvements, the impact of the HIV virus was often the focus for altering mortality in the 1980s and early 1990s.
The authors consider how reserves should have changed, and they reject the approach of the Maturity Guarantees Working Party of using a corridor. I fully agree. To my mind, the use of a corridor merely introduces more arbitrary parameters. The authors prefer 'marking-to-market'.
In Section 9 the authors introduce the idea of conditional tail expectations, which are theoretically preferable.
However, with the number of arbitrary parameters (now complemented by more arbitrary adjustments, which enter in Section 8, to do with the discount rate), it is unsurprising that very similar reserves and charges can be achieved without this additional complication. Now might be a good point to mention state price deflators. The authors are not keen on this approach, as stated in Section C.14. However, I think that deflators are very useful. Not only do they deliver market-consistent results, but all the arbitrariness of differing discount rates, as used by the authors in ¶8.2.5, is made redundant. The use of the unit share account is already a form of stochastic discounting, so why not make the next step and use deflators?
Much of the paper has an historical aspect to it, but, with the introduction of option pricing and hedging techniques in Section 10, the paper brings us up to date. The inappropriate constraint on the investment of reserves being in the unit account, equities, is swept away for a dynamic methodology. The paper assumes that three assets are available to carry out the hedging; the unit fund; a zero coupon bond that matures at the policy's maturing date; and a deferred life annuity to allow the hedging.
The authors construct Brownian bridges between the annual outputs from the Wilkie model. The Brownian bridges are key; there appears to be little dependency on the annual model. This is a plausible observation, given the importance of standard deviation and correlation but not the drift (or force of return) on the hedging assets. A model that produces full yield curves might have been more appropriate.
The option price is calculated, and, for our 30-year policy, using PMA68 or the PMA90 table at 1985, the value of the policy with the option is £101.39. This is both the initial premium and the option. In other words, the option has a minimal impact on the price. The authors also calculate the price of the guarantee after allowing for mortality and allowing for the deficit arising from the imperfect hedging. This is termed the 'reduced option price'. As at December 1984, this value is £1.13 for a 30-year policy. As at 1985, the reserve for the 30-year policy at a security level of 99% is now about £2.50, compared with the £21 that we saw earlier, using the quantile method. This seems quite a powerful demonstration of the efficiency of hedging.
Repeating the calculation as at 2001, the option price had grown to £133 -unsurprising, because it is now heavily in the money. Importantly, for all the option strategies the authors give the relevant hedging positions.
I have a few comments about the Wilkie model and the full yield curve. What would happen if I used a model which allowed me to calibrate exactly to the yield curve on any day, which produced output at any duration that I want to see, and a full yield curve? I did this to compare some of the numbers, and calculated some of the reserves. Looking at the initial quantile reserves, there can be very substantial differences, of up to 20%. This is not really surprising, because we have a direct comparison between two models. The inputs of these models are going to be very important. What is interesting and, I think, relevant is when I calculate the option price using deflators. I get a number which is very similar to that in the paper. What we are seeing is, if you use a robust methodology, your model is of less importance. The results from using the market-consistent model using deflators are shown in the last two columns of The paper rightly pays significant attention to the practical aspects of hedging: including differences between the real world and the model; the length of the liabilities; and the availability of the assets required to hedge. In addition, transaction costs are mentioned, but not quantified. The authors discuss the concept of a fair price, and suggest that the theoretical option price is only the 'fair price' if you can actually carry out the hedge. We are fortunate in the U.K., in that we have highly developed derivatives markets that show that hedging can and does work. Further, if we look at the instruments required to carry out the hedge they are primarily fixed-interest securities, which are precisely where the markets are most developed, offering significant liquidity and a range of instruments.
Despite the practical difficulties in hedging, I am surprised by the authors' conclusion that, for GAOs, hedging for practical purposes is severely limited. Note that we have not even considered the instruments likely to be used in hedging. The swap market, or more tailored instruments like 'swaptions', could be helpful for practical implementation as mentioned in the papers Van Bezooyen, Exley & Mehta(1998) and Pelsser (2002) on this subject This paper succeeds in bringing together different strands of knowledge and in being highly relevant to current actuarial work. There are many other areas of the paper that I have not even touched upon, and which are worthy of study and further research.
What lessons can we learn? Well, as always there are a few regrets. It is a regret that the actuarial profession was too inward looking, as shown by the authors' comment, in ¶2.1.3, that "in the 1980s option pricing methodology was only just becoming known". This is followed, in ¶2.1.6, by a list of references to option pricing papers that address relevant questions, all dating from the 1970s.
Other lessons are that, by updating mortality and financial information, reserves for GAOs would have grown substantially since 1985, but hindsight is a wonderful thing. That still leaves the awkward question: "Where do the additional reserves and the final payouts come from?" When we use quantile reserving, it is clear that the capital base must suffer. Alternatively, if we had perfect hedging this would be self-financing, and no further capital would be required. Admittedly, we do not have perfect hedging, nor are we likely to have it in the near future. However, if we did try to hedge, the need for substantial injections of capital would have been greatly reduced. I think that this is an important lesson. Even given all the difficulties with hedging, I suggest that it is probably the way forward.
Despite my personal views that some elements of the paper are sub-optimal, there is much to admire in it and many lessons to be learnt. Marking-to-market comes through as an important financial discipline. The true test of the importance of this paper will be whether, looking back in years to come, the methods have been successfully implemented.
Mr A. M. Eastwood, F.F.A.: I found the paper somewhat daunting, but it certainly stimulated a few points, some of which may not be directly relevant to the paper.
The paper models mostly unit-linked style annuity guarantees. As I understand the current European Union inspired close matching requirements, the approach of investing the option reserve in property-linked funds is necessary at the moment. That does not mean to say that you cannot actually hedge, but it may absorb much capital, and therefore limit the ability to hedge, in practice.
I now turn to with-profits, which is different -at least we thought it was. Certainly, when most with-profits GAO policies were written, the actuaries, if not the policyholders, would have expected some pooling of risk, with bonuses being declared by way of distribution of surplus. It seems to me that the biggest potential flaw, with the benefit of hindsight, was, perhaps, to undervalue the legal risk, manifested not least in the House of Lords judgment on Equitable Life, and particularly in the form of that judgment.
As a newly-qualified actuary in the late 1980s, I spent a couple of years modelling the operation of with-profits business, including business with GAOs using the 1984 Wilkie model (Wilkie, 1986a) . The challenge that I remember was to improve the investment mix and bonus decisions by way of inputs and processes programmed into the model, so as to bring the cost to the fund of all the with-profits guarantees, both simple maturity guarantees and those with GAOs, down to an acceptable level. That is, effectively, to bring the crosssubsidies, or the charge to the estate, down to an acceptable level.
The numbers in the paper are instructive, and, certainly, when you get onto the newer mortality tables, are quite scary. However, it does not surprise me that unit-linked style guarantees are much more expensive than with-profits guarantees.
If there was a mistake, I think that the mistake that we have made, as actuaries, as advisers to life companies over the years, was not to ensure that the companies said more about the risks to which with-profits investment exposes the policyholder. Looking at some of the Queen's Counsel opinions that were published in connection with the various aspects of the Equitable Life case, it struck me that the position may have changed, with the introduction of the 1986 Financial Services Act, in a way that was not quite appreciated, or dealt with adequately, at the time. Key features documents were introduced, as were illustrations based on asset shares. It seems to me, now, that, on some interpretations, the with-profits contract may have quietly moved towards some kind of right to asset share with guarantees bolted on top. The only things which can be charged to those asset shares are items covered by risks that were highlighted in the key features issued at the time, or in the charges that were anticipated in the illustrations. How many key features documents highlight, even today, a risk that you may find that, in part, you are funding somebody else's benefits? Perhaps such cross-subsidies are something that we think of as obvious in the nature of with-profits, but there is clearly one view of the proposition which says otherwise. I do not think that that alternative view is financially coherent. The numbers in this paper demonstrate why it is impracticable from a financial standpoint, but the legal risk is there, and we need to ensure, going forwards, that the with-profits risks are sufficiently high profile in policyholder communication.
My second theme is the meaning of what I describe, somewhat loosely, as reserving at the 99% threshold level. Until conditional tail expectations are introduced in the paper, I believe that the approach described is to assess the amount of capital required to ensure that, using a particular stochastic model, there is a 99% chance of the office's obligations being met over the lifetime of the business on the books at the time of calculation. That would be my instinctive interpretation of the sums to be done when trying to calculate capital required at a 99% threshold level. However, it does seem different from the likely direction of the FSA's approach, as I understand it, which is to assess the capital required to assure a 99% chance of having enough capital one year later to cover the fair value of the liabilities then. There may be different percentages or different time periods introduced, but that is my understanding of the way in which they are heading, which seems more consistent with a banking approach.
So, there is a legitimate rationale for both approaches. I am not sure that I know which is more appropriate. I suspect that implicitly underlying the FSA's style of approach -and I hope that I will be forgiven if I am wrong -is an assumption that, if all else fails, there will be some kind of market in long-term insurance liabilities. That is the sort of thing that I feel is likely to evaporate just when it is needed. I would be interested in others' views on the right approach. It may be that we want to steer the regulator towards the approach that is set out in the paper. If so, we need to articulate our reasons and persuade the FSA of the right approach. I am particularly interested in the views of those more financially economically literate than I would regard myself.
Whichever of these two approaches is adopted, I agree with the authors, and the view of the opener that marking to market seems to be the way forward. Having said that, I confess to an increasing concern that, with everything in the financial world being marked-tomarket, we are going to see greater and greater financial instability. I think that that problem will be exacerbated by the need to recalibrate the stochastic models regularly, according to financial conditions and implied volatility at the time.
On a practical point, I have another question for the financial economists. Because of the complex interactions in the case of with-profits business, which I think can only be modelled sensibly at with-profits fund level, if you allow cross-subsidies, the computational demands remain an obstacle even today. I wonder whether there are some financial economics tricks available to us which would cut down on the number of simulations required when determining values such as conditional tail expectations, as set out in the paper.
Mr C. E. Barton, F.I.A.: I have not absorbed all the mathematics of the paper, but I am confident that it is of great value. It chimes with what I have long felt, ever since playing a small part in the preparation of Mr R. H. Blunt's paper (Blunt, 1954) .
Although much of this paper is concerned with techniques which had not been developed 20 years ago, there should have been a general awareness of the dangers of options long before then; there were warnings given in Haynes & Kirton (1952) and Redington (1952) .
As the authors of this paper make clear in ¶12.2, if the cost of options had been recognised in the 1980s and 1990s, insurers would have been alerted to their danger, and should have stopped offering them, without charging and specifically reserving for them, much earlier. In fact, options should never have been underwritten without charging and reserving for them. I fear that, in this long and complex paper, the important strictures of ¶ ¶12.2, 12.3 and 12.4, directed at the woeful inadequacy of insurers, the profession and the supervisory authorities, may not receive the attention that they deserve. I can well understand why this paper has concentrated on the theoretical aspects, but I feel that the principle, or lack of principle, of the profession's approach to options should be, indeed, should already have been, addressed much more vehemently. Professor Wilkie made this point in his trenchant letter to The Actuary magazine in November 2000, and also in the last three paragraphs of his Guest Editorial in the British Actuarial Journal a few months later (Wilkie, 2001 ). The Corley Report produced an excellent history of the Equitable Life debacle, but was somewhat diffident in making judgement. I do not think that this should be left entirely to the Penrose Committee. In the part of the British Actuarial Journal which has just been issued, there is an interesting note of the meeting held by the Faculty on the Equitable Life in November 2001 (Waters, 2002) .
I am a little concerned at the use of the term 'contingency reserve', and exactly what we mean by it. Paragraph 2.3.9 refers to 'quantile (contingency) reserve'. The word 'contingency' being in parenthesis may suggest that the terms 'quantile' and 'contingency' are synonymous, but they are not interchangeable. Whilst a quantile reserve may be regarded as a form of contingency reserve, a contingency reserve is not necessarily a quantile reserve. I have always regarded a 'contingency reserve' as an amount decided upon arbitrarily to provide for unexpected and unspecified contingencies. Thus, the basic liability of a life assurance contract has not usually been referred to as a contingency reserve; rather the latter is an amount over and above the basic reserve, and it may be confusing to use the term 'contingency reserve' for rationally calculated quantile or conditional tail expectation (CTE) reserves.
In the antepenultimate paragraph of Wilkie (2001) he referred to the lack of attention given to the determination of the cost of options among financial economists and actuaries, and went on to emphasise the need for "contingency reserves, or as a nest egg set aside for a rainy day, as 'free assets' or the 'orphan estate'". The terms 'nest egg' and 'free assets' seem more in line with arbitrary contingency reserves rather than with quantile or CTE reserves. Reference to so-called 'orphan assets' tends to give credence to those who attempt to argue that there is nothing wrong with insurers building up such assets. Indeed, there are those who claim that it is necessary to do so. In fact, orphan assets represent amounts of which past policyholders have been deprived. Free assets, on the other hand, are vitally necessary, should consist of shareholders' capital, if any, plus, much more importantly, that part of the asset shares of current policyholders -that is the nonconsolidated part -which will be paid in terminal bonuses. Any smoothing of benefits should be on an equitable basis between current policyholders. There should be no cross-subsidies between past, present and future policyholders, in which case orphan assets would not arise. With so much emphasis being placed on transparency, the terms contingency reserve, which occur many times in the paper, free reserves or free assets, (referred to in ¶ ¶3.4.7 and 8.2.2), the estate ( ¶8.2.2), and also orphan assets (not referred to in this paper) need to be carefully defined, with no ambiguity whatsoever, and only used when appropriate.
In ¶2.3.9 it is assumed that there are should be an initial contingency reserve of Q α of which Q α -A would be put up by the shareholders (or with-profits policyholders generally, if the office is mutual). I would suggest that, even in a proprietary office, the general body of withprofits policyholders, or a defined group of them, could put up some or all of the reserves for the option. This is what has happened in practice, since, until very recent years, there have been virtually no increases in capital provided by shareholders. The paper goes on to suggest that shareholders should earn, on that part of the option reserve put up by them, a rate of interest h per annum more than they would receive from the normal investment proceeds. The paper does not specify whether this would also apply to any part of the option reserve financed by with-profits policyholders. Perhaps this could be clarified. To consider the rate of interest to be earned on capital put up by shareholders is eminently reasonable, and it is surprising that, so far as I know, there has never been any attempt to apply a similar approach to the overall return to shareholders, rather than the commonly accepted basis of 10% of surplus to shareholders, for which there is no justification in principle.
Mr A. D. Smith: I cannot help but be impressed by the effort and attention to detail in the paper. There is a huge amount that we can learn from it. I expect that actuaries will analyse the numerical tables for some time to come. These data will become a benchmark for offices seeking to evaluate their own GAO promises. For me, the most important lesson is that capital market pricing is part, but not all, of the solution for GAOs. The fact that capital markets provide no perfect hedge imposes extra costs on insurers, and these need to be loaded into the price charged to policyholders. The policyholder charge, therefore, consists of two parts, A and B, as in Section 2.3. Part A represents the present value of the cash flow itself suitably discounted; part B represents the insurer's internal risk management costs, including an appropriate reward for shareholders on any of their capital locked in to support the risk.
Without diminishing the value of the paper, I should also like to suggest three possible improvements:
(1) the use of deflators rather than equity returns to discount the benefit cash flows in the computation of A in ¶2.3.9 -and on this point I agree with the opener;
(2) a reinterpretation of the shareholder's required return at h in ¶2.3.11 in terms of frictional costs of holding capital -a number of speakers have already alluded to the difficulty in quantifying that number, and I shall give some suggestions; and (3) allowing for dynamic capital management, particularly early release of contingency reserves, when it is no longer likely that they would be required.
I consider discounting first. Here the paper answers some questions, but raises more. I take the example of a policy valued at the end of 2001 with 20 years until vesting. According to Table 6 .4r, the mean discounted guaranteed option price is £23.44 per £100 single premium. On the other hand, if I decide to hedge, Table 10 .4.9 gives the mean discounted cost as £37.92. That is more than 60% higher than the previous value. How can the mean present value of a cash flow be 60% higher if I decide to hedge? Remember, the policyholder guarantee is unaffected by whether the insurer decides to hedge or not. So, we are discounting the same cash flow in each case. The 60% difference must be a consequence of the way that the authors have chosen to discount. That is in the asset return which they used to discount the liability. When they decide not to hedge interest rate risks, they take interest rate bets which, according to the Wilkie model, are expected to pay off handsomely; but we have to ask whether such asset risk premiums are reason enough to record a lower liability valuation.
I suggest that it would have been better to use deflators to discount the cash flows to derive the present value A. Deflator techniques cause the value of the cash flow to depend on the risk characteristics of that cash flow, not on arbitrary assumptions about future investment strategies to finance the cash flow. Using deflators would, at a stroke, remove the spurious dependence of cash flow present values on the way in which the cash flow is financed.
I now consider the shareholder required return at h of 1% or 2%, discussed in ¶2.3.11. To put it in perspective, according to Table 2 .5.3 a 2% charge for capital could account for more than 80% of the total required policyholder charges. This assumption is therefore critical. A clear articulation of its logic would have been helpful; the discussion in ¶3.2.6 raises the issue, but lacks a satisfactory answer to the question of where h comes from. This mysterious risk discount margin is a long-standing puzzle from profit testing and embedded value work, but the parameter choice is particularly significant for GAOs.
I suggest that the 1% or 2% should represent the deadweight cost to an insurer of holding capital. The largest element is agency cost: that is cost to shareholders arising from the fact that management may invest capital in value destroying projects that nevertheless benefit managers. We should also consider the fact that surplus assets still cost something to manage, and that their investment return triggers tax liabilities. These deadweight costs are not a component of additional shareholder return, but rather a drag on shareholder returns. Such deadweight costs need to be eliminated or charged to policyholders if the business is to provide acceptable shareholder returns. Thus, h is not some extra return required by shareholders in excess of returns available elsewhere in the market. As several speakers, including the opener, have already pointed out, that would be nonsense in view of the liabilities here and the correlation that they have with the equity market. Instead, h is a measure of the internal frictional costs which must be offset by policyholder charges in order for shareholders to earn a market return.
My third suggested improvement relates to active capital management. I return again to Table 2 .5.3, this time looking at a 30-year GAO. In the last column the policyholder charge is £13.84, of which £1.74 is the mean option cost. The remaining £12.11 is the capital charge. This calculation assumes a substantial capital allocation in order to meet the guarantee with a 99.9% probability, but it turns out that this reserve was only required at all with a 24% probability. In the remaining 76% of cases the reserve is, with hindsight, entirely redundant.
The authors conclude, in ¶12.7, that marking-to-market is a preferable way of managing the reserves, which they define, in ¶3.4.3, as adjusting the reserves to the same probability level each year. It is then admitted, in ¶3.4.5, that it is difficult to see how the initial reserves corresponding to the actuary's chosen probability level could be calculated without simulations within simulations. However, I think that it is worth trying. My rough calculation is to suggest that, in the 30-year example of Table 2 .5.3, a margin of 3% or so of initial investments could be saved just by releasing redundant capital in a timely manner. This gives insurers a good reason to make an effort at these challenging assumptions. There is much to learn from simple models, where these problems can be more easily solved. The gain from the greater realism of a complex model, such as the Wilkie model, is hollow if, at the same time, you forfeit the ability to solve the commercial problem in hand.
I now comment on lessons learnt. In Section 12.4 it is asked why few or no offices had either charged or reserved the GAOs, and why the then supervisors did not ask offices whether they had set up the required reserves. Section 2.1 takes the perspective of a prescient actuary, who, in 1985, could have warned a life office to hedge and price its GAO risks, but I wonder whether that is the conclusion that a wise 1985 actuary would have drawn from the stochastic models then available. Armed with information on 99.9th percentiles, would our actuary not have been much more alarmed by the equity bets in the life industry, especially in with-profits funds with guaranteed liabilities? Yet, as it happened, these equity bets turned out rather well. The guarantees expired out of the money. Some of the proceeds from the equity boom even provided the means for many life offices to meet obligations under equally unhedged GAO policies. We deceive ourselves if we think that we can go back in time and somehow remove from the table only those bets which subsequently went bad. We can tackle all of them, or we can tackle none of them.
I commend the Faculty for its courage in sponsoring a paper on GAOs. This is an issue both topical and troublesome for U.K. actuaries. For example, at the present time it is quite plausible that, when people are thinking about inflation assumptions and uncertainty in inflation, they will place far too much weight on inflation remaining at about 2.5%, without much uncertainty. However, if you look back over history, you can see that inflation has ranged over much wider values. Equally, if we go back to 1985, or to the 1970s when these contracts were being sold, they had interest rate guarantees, where the guarantee would only start to come into the money when interest rates fell below 7% or thereabouts. At that time, if you took the actuarial judgement approach, the prevailing view was that interest rates were going to remain very high, well above 10%. Actuaries, at the time, were not placing any emphasis, or any great probability, on the possibility of interest rates falling to much lower levels. Nevertheless, if you looked back over history, you would certainly see that interest rates had not always been at levels above 10%. Therefore, it is important to think much more about the bigger picture than to think about what has happened in the recent past. This is really a modelling issue. When you are in such a situation, prudence is very important. It is not necessarily whether you get the best estimate for a model, but for a situation like this you should be thinking about what happens if things go wrong.
In the modelling context, when you are using the Wilkie model, or whatever other asset model you would want to use, now, in 1985, or in the future, you ought not to be thinking just about getting the probabilities precisely right, but also whether the range of results is appropriate for the contract which you are considering. Certainly, in the present context of a GAO, it would have been appropriate to have a model where interest rates came up, with reasonable probability, with a range consistent with what we have observed in the past. So, looking over the 20th century, that would be from, say, 2.5% up to 15% or more. Obviously, people were not thinking in that sort of way. That is just a comment on modelling and how we ought to be thinking in terms of the future in modelling, besides the specific issue of pricing and reserving.
One of the main conclusions about the options part of the paper, and this was a section where the theoretical best that you could get out of the option pricing methodology was being looked at, was that you would have:
(a) 100% in equities; (b) your short sell zero-coupon bonds; and (c) go long in the deferred annuity.
The conclusion was that, although this gives us a good benchmark, it is, to some extent, impractical, because of the short selling of zero coupon bonds. I think that there is something that we can learn from looking at how banks tackle this kind of problem. This is the point that the opener made to some extent, and I think that it is worth elaborating and reinforcing it. Banks do not look at just a single policy, say an equity option, where, to hedge, you have to go long in one asset and short in another. They look at the whole of their portfolio of derivatives, and short holdings in some assets may be offset by long holdings in the same assets, but associated with a different derivative contract. So, if you take an insurance company, you should not just be looking at the assets backing the GAOs, but you should be looking also at, say, endowment assurances and other contracts. In GAO hedging we are short in zero coupon bonds. However, there may be positive holdings of some bonds which are backing other types of contract. So, looking at the bigger picture just within the insurance company is very important, and, indeed, may help the option hedging position. There are also alternatives to which the opener alluded. This comes from looking at the derivatives markets and, possibly, more the traded derivatives markets, but also the over-thecounter market, because in the derivatives markets we have long bond futures and contracts of that type. It is much more easy for insurance companies to go short in these sorts of assets than it would be to go short in zero-coupon bonds. Equally well, there are 'swaption' contracts which you can get over-the-counter from banks, although there are potentially associated credit risk aspects to that type of arrangement. Nevertheless, you can reduce your risks very substantially compared with the approach of just having 100% equities and doing nothing else. Risk reduction is one of the greatest things that we should be learning from the option pricing methodology.
Coming to Appendix C, where there have been some comments on the use of deflators, the opener made a comment which I think could have been misinterpreted. That is in terms of the option pricing technology. This is the particular approach that you can use for pricing an option contract. What has been used in Appendix C could be described as using what would be described as the martingale approach to option pricing, whereas the opener and Mr Smith were talking about the deflator approach. The most important thing about this -and it is a very common misconception -is that, for a model like this is, or, say, the BlackScholes model, where you can hedge in a way which eliminates risk, the deflator approach and the martingale approach are one and the same. They will give you exactly the same result, the same hedging strategy, and it is more just a matter of preference which particular approach you take.
Also, which approach you take; the deflator approach or the martingale approach; depends very much on your initial model. Some models are much more natural to use in the deflator framework. Other models are much more natural to use within the martingale framework. Usually you find, as has been found in Appendix C, that if you try to transfer from one approach to the other, things get very complicated. That goes both ways. If you start off with a deflator-based model, it would look complicated in the martingale framework, and viceversa.
Mr R. E. Brimblecombe, C.B.E., F.I.A.: I start by going back in history. Anybody would think that GAOs are something new, but their history goes back a long way. Many large life offices were issuing group endowment policies in the 1940s and the 1950s, and GAOs were pressed on life offices by the market. Looking a bit further on in history, many contracts had to have GAOs so that life offices could claim that they were in the pensions annuity fund, and therefore gross contracts. This was a requirement of the Inland Revenue.
However, the main point is that the options were put in, not as a marketing tool, as is often thought now, but for other reasons. Even worse than that, offices said: "Let us have the 9 to 1 option for males at age 65. It fits in well with what the Inland Revenue practice notes say, and then we just fix the annuity rates for females and for other pension ages around that". There was no conscious effort to say that this was, say, 7% on a particular mortality basis. These were just figures that were convenient to use.
Turning to the paper, as a previous speaker has said, it is, perhaps, a pity that more was not made of with-profits policies in relation to GAOs. Different considerations do apply. Consciously or unconsciously, there are additional margins which are available in terms of the bonus philosophy of the office. It is also clear from the paper that the majority of actuarial literature on the subject of guarantees and options -and I am grateful to the authors for the substantial bibliography of the actuarial literature and papers on the subject -dealt with maturity guarantees for unit-linked policies. Unit-linked policies with maturity guarantees were a conscious decision by life offices to have a marketing advantage. Unit-linked policies, when they first came out, were seen as an alternative to with-profits, but eventually somebody said: "Would it not be a good idea to put a maturity guarantee on them?". Therefore they were provided. Subsequently, people realised that it was important to put up additional reserves and/or appropriate pricing for that guarantee. The whole of the Maturity Guarantees Working Party paper (Ford et al., 1980) and the reference in ¶12.3 to Guidance Note 8, are based on the premise that we were talking about maturity guarantees under unit-linked products.
However, one thing that the paper has done is to highlight how costly guarantees are whether for GAOs or for unit-linked policies. It is also absolutely clear that, if actuaries had started to consider the effects and the costs of guaranteed annuity options in the 1980s, there were plenty of actuarial tools available in order for them to carry out the required modelling.
However, to me the greatest message that comes out of the paper is not the fact that the interest rate guarantees were expensive, which they obviously have been (but only in latter years), but that the main problem is that the mortality assumed under GAOs has not changed for many years. It is the strain caused by improvements in mortality rather than the strains in interest rates, possibly with the exception of the last few years, which have caused many of the problems. With the benefit of hindsight, it seems slightly puzzling that actuaries in life offices spent a lot of time dealing with the pricing of, and reserving for, their immediate annuities and deferred annuities, which were substantial at the time, to allow for future improvements in mortality, but actually took no particular notice of the mortality guarantees which were then appearing in GAOs. That may seem surprising, albeit with the benefit of hindsight. If life office actuaries had spent as much time concentrating on the mortality strains appearing in their GAOs as with their basic annuity business in the 1980s onwards, quite probably we would not have the problems that we have today. The authors are somewhat critical that the profession's forecast improvement in annuitant mortality, time and again, proved to be underestimated. The paper well illustrates the effect that this has had in reserving and pricing for GAOs. Speaking with hindsight, again, in the past we neglected the issue at our peril, because mortality was moving our way on life assurance, and pensions were funding for cash anyway.
This has not gone unnoticed by the financial press. I quote from the Guardian of 7 January 2003: "You and I may have been reading for years about how leaps in nutrition, healthier lifestyles and medical improvements have conspired to extend life expectancy so dramatically, but to the actuaries crunching numbers in some windowless Britannic bunker this has come as something of a shock". While the way in which the criticism is expressed is unfair to the profession, I think that there is a serious point here. Perhaps more might have been done to research the possible implications of changing lifestyles, etc. To make forecasts, we need a rather better understanding of the drivers for change, and not just treat it as a statistical exercise.
The authors suggest, in ¶11.3, using stochastic mortality. There may well be a place for this, for instance to quantify how the experience of small offices might depart from the population, but I really cannot see how it will help our understanding of trends. I appreciate that the profession is now making some moves, such as joint seminars and discussions, with the medical profession, and I believe that research into the implications of genetic testing is especially valuable. Perhaps the profession could do more by sponsoring research before we are caught out again. My concern is the perception that the baby boom generation, who are now in their 40s and 50s, are said to have a much healthier lifestyle than the generation now in their 20s and their 30s and that mortality trends could well see a reversal in future.
I make one other point. In my experience, a stochastic model can give real insights into the financial workings of a life fund, but the difficulty of using it is in the vast numbers of figures that result. The organisation and the presentation of the results is very important.
In the body of the paper I counted 93 tables and just six figures. I would have found it easier if there were more figures, especially in Sections 5 and 6, where there are many references to previous tables. The reader has to keep turning back to compare tables. I appreciate that much of the hard-earned detail can be lost in the figures, but I find that I can more quickly grasp what is going on. Dr N. M. Bryson, F.F.A.: I comment on one or two practical aspects. I was a member of the Fair Valuation Working Party that produced a paper discussed here in 2002 (Hairs et al., 2002 . The paper illustrates very well the challenge implicit in turning the ideas of fair valuation for accounting, and then using them as a basis for solvency matters into practical reality. Although the paper was written for another purpose, nevertheless, before one could put a fair value on guaranteed annuities, one would need to take on board the concepts and mathematics of the paper. This aspect is mentioned in ¶12.10. This paper deals with only one particular type of policy issued by U.K. insurers, yet still runs to 129 pages. The challenge of turning concepts into practical processes is visible. Also visible, from the variation in results depending on the model used and the assumptions employed, is the need for an Actuarial Standards Board if comparability of results between companies is thought desirable, although I note what the opener said in this context.
Linked to that is the point made in ¶10.3.1, regarding theoretical hedging strategies that cannot be put into practice, and also the point in ¶10.6.7 about option prices being marginal prices. I should also mention that the point made in ¶12.11, regarding contingency margins, as defined in the paper, being a substitute for, not an addition to, the traditional statutory solvency margin, is one with which I agree.
I also draw attention to the point made in ¶3.2.2. This is an area that we also debated in our Working Party, and I agree with the authors that there is a need to be clear just what standard is to be aimed at. Mr Eastwood mentioned this earlier. However, I fear that the public may see things somewhat differently from the profession; the evidence suggests that human nature seems to lead people to interpret low probabilities very differently from the way in which a mathematician might. The point that I want to make is that it is crucially important that we emphasise that the way in which we calculate risk-based capital is to calculate prudential reserves and to deduct the best estimate technical provisions. That is the way that we do it, but if you talk to the regulators, the way in which they think that it is done is that you calculate best estimate reserves and add risk-based capital to get the prudential reserves. They get confused and need help.
The reason that we have to do it this way is to avoid some behavioural consequences. If we are going to do best estimate reserves plus risk-based capital, then the directors will say: "All the risk is in the risk-based capital, so please, Mr Actuary, when you come up with the best estimate reserves, will you come up with as little as possible, so that I have lots of dividend capacity." However, if we go for the prudential reserves first, and the risk-based capital is the difference between that and the best estimate, then we could not care less what the best estimate is so far as customer protection is concerned. You will hear this argument quite soon, when the Financial Standards Authority (FSA) produces its Role of the Actuary report.
There is a similar parallel issue when we talk about surplus. The regulators think that we declare a surplus and decide how to distribute it, whereas, of course, we determine a bonus rate and test whether it is sustainable. It is important again, when talking to the regulators, that we communicate what we actually do, to avoid confusion. It is not quite the same, but there is a similar parallel on the pensions side, where we continue to think about future cash flows for funding pension schemes. Suddenly, FRS 17 puts it all in a value, and we say: "But we do not do it that way," but, actually, the accountants do, and we have to help in those communication pieces. If we can all be aware of where this dissonance is, between the ways in which we do things and the ways in which they tend to be presented, so that we can help the communication, I would be grateful. Table 2 .5.1. This table exhibits a number of interesting features. As the authors observe, the actual costs themselves are not particularly high. They amount from between five and 60 basis points, if you look at either the mean cost or the 99th percentile. It is quite plausible to understand, in that context, had actuaries at the time begun to think, although not carried out all these calculations, the profit margin in the contract which might be expected to cover at least some of the costs. Clearly, things have turned out differently.
One specific question that I have concerns this table, and is about the strong similarity between the portfolio line and the sum line, which is really saying that we are not getting substantial diversification across time due to a portfolio effect. I found this surprising, particularly when they were using an autoregressive model; but if it is true, I am not sure that I understand it.
Thinking more generally about the paper, contingency reserves have already been considered, and Mr Goford mentioned risk-based capital. We need to recognise that the prudent percentile reserves, if we accept the methodology, represent risk-based capital requirements going forward, and not necessarily provisions, although I take the comments of Mr Goford as to the way that we might then start calculating those or the order of the calculation. I would also suggest that we possibly need to recognise that risk-based capital should be set up at an office level, and not at a product or a single policy level, and recognise risk diversification within that portfolio and the negative correlations within an office.
In ¶3.2.2 the authors write about the right probability level to set for quantile reserves. These are extremely important issues if we are going to use stochastic approaches as a regulatory standard. In Section 3.4 the authors ask how initial risk-based capital reserves should evolve as experience emerges. I, along with a number of other speakers, agree with the conclusion that the more modern concepts of marking-to-market each year would be appropriate. However, we do see substantial changes in the capital requirements and, in particular, substantial increases, even on a portfolio basis, and even when we do not strengthen mortality assumptions. Such capital is going to have to come from outside the existing amounts set aside.
My question for everyone is: "How should the regulators actually determine how much capital an office would have to hold in those circumstances?" If the office had held only enough capital to cover the provisions themselves and the risk-based capital calculated at the beginning of the year, we would see many years in which, at the end of the year, the office would not have enough money available to cover the required provisions at that time. The authors, I imagine correctly, although Mr Smith might differ, suggest that the calculations to ensure that the amount set aside at outset would always be sufficient would be quite difficult at this stage.
I am also concerned that the meaningfulness to our end audience, whether that is the FSA, commentators or the general public, of what a quantile reserve means will actually be understood. I strongly suspect that the public will wish to use hindsight when judging whether or not we should have reserved or provided for a given scenario. Coming out with statements now that we are facing a one-in-a-100 year problem is going to be very difficult when the public say: "Well, this is what happened. How could you not have seen that that might happen?" I gained the impression from the paper that we might be talking about extreme scenarios, which would have been assessed as having a less than 1% chance of actually having occurred. I make that deduction tentatively based on the fact that the 99th percentile reserves have increased. I wonder what the initial level of confidence would be such that the reserves were sufficient today, at the same level of confidence. So, if we had set up a reserve at the x% quantile in 1984, for the same level of quantile confidence, what level of the reserve today would look as if that initial reserve was correct? I am not sure whether the authors have calculated the answer to that question.
I now refer to a more general concern about hindsight. I think that the last three years of stock market returns have been negative. At the end of 1999, it would have seemed extremely unlikely that we would have three years of negative stock market returns, yet it has happened. If we had set risk-based capital on the basis that it was unlikely, how would our regulators and our public feel at this stage? Therefore, I suggest that we should, perhaps, be having constructive dialogue with regulators and the public about scenarios that we expect life offices to remain adequate and pay out claims rather than necessarily focusing on a 1% or a 0.1% confidence interval in our debate.
Several speakers talked about the options themselves. There seemed to be some consensus that, if these options had been properly evaluated in 1984, they would have been recognised as dangerous and not offered. I have suggested that, perhaps, at that time the overall cost did not really look all that big. Mr Brimblecombe explained that, in his view, it started out of tax considerations and convenience rather than a marketing tool.
There has been much talk about judgement. Dr Cairns pointed out that actuaries tend to focus unduly on present conditions when they work out the possible range of futures, rather than on the wide range of actual conditions that had existed in the past. He suggested ranges of interest from 2.5% to 15% might not be unreasonable. Mr Smith talked about the lack of principle that we have seen in many derivations of embedded values as to the definition of h, and suggested, for example, that this should be a deadweight cost associated with capital and tax considerations. Questions for him are: Is it any less judgemental to set it that way? Who is going to make that judgement?" I guess that it is the shareholders", is possibly the answer. I am thinking in terms of actually doing the calculations.
Dr Bryson suggested that, if we are going to go forward with stochastic modelling of this sort of form for the determination of risk-based capital, we will probably need to develop standards through an actuarial standards board or similar body.
The opener was uncomfortable with the setting of the security level being essentially judgemental. Mr Barton did not consider the quantile reserves, themselves, as contingency reserves, but as calculated proper reserves. Mr Eastwood pointed out that the view of the FSA of what a quantile reserve might represent is more akin to the banking risk-based capital one-year view, rather than the long-term provision implicit in the paper, and that many actuaries would consider. There is general support here for the marking-to-market approach. There was some controversy about the investment policy that should be assumed for the backing reserves. The paper envisages, in its later sections, that we might use a hedging strategy. The opener certainly seemed to feel that that was more appropriate, certainly than the insistence that the investments had to be in the same form as the underlying assets, although Mr Eastwood pointed out, and I think he may be right, that, at present, the close matching requirements would require any explicit reserve derived for this purpose to be invested in the same way.
Dr Cairns suggested that when we are looking at the hedging approach, the difficulties with the lack of existence of explicit assets in the market to back these particular liabilities might be avoided by considering the banking approach, when we would look at the whole fund and we might find implicit assets or negative assets within other parts of the fund, and that would enable ourselves to calculate an overall hedge.
One of the things that the paper brought out for me, and which a number of speakers recognised, was that mortality has been a substantial part of this problem. It has not been just the variation in interest rates. In fact, it is obviously the combination of greater mortality improvements than anticipated and much lower interest rates than anticipated together that have caused the real costs for these guarantees. Some speakers expressed surprise that this was not addressed earlier. Mr Pike suggested that we really need to look at different forms of research if we are to form good judgements on future mortality trends, looking at medical developments and other sorts of research, and not simply at stochastic modelling based on the existing data.
Globally and in the U.K. we are seeing a convergence between insurance and banking approaches, and we must try to learn from each other. I agree with the carefully chosen words of ¶3.2.1, where the authors write that the percentile reserves: "are not, like a banking 'value at risk', the probabilities of success or failure over a short period. Yet they are analogous..." We should neither ignore that analogy nor stretch it unquestioningly. I believe that a key difference is the ability to trade, or close out, many banking risks at the end of that short period, due to a liquid market in such risks, and that tradeable assets needed to construct hedges are available. If hedging and close out were possible for an insurance policy, I think that much of the value at risk framework could translate readily into the insurance framework. However, if that is not the case, I suggest stress and scenario testing and stochastic modelling will provide a natural bridge between the insurance and the banking regulatory approaches, and this paper has provided much interesting food for thought in this area.
Professor A. D. Wilkie, C.B.E., F.F.A., F.I.A. (replying): Many points have been made. First, I
give short replies to a number of general points that were made by a variety of different people. Yes, we used judgement in some cases. My view on this is that actuaries, or anyone else in this kind of business, should use scientific methods so far as they can, but sometimes the scientific methods run out and they have to end up using judgement. Judgement is what you use when you cannot use science, but where you have to make a decision about something. However, I like to use science as far as possible in the first place. The next point is about what accountants would call provisions and what they would call reserves. In the past, actuaries typically called these reserves and contingency reserves. They add together to the total prudential reserves. Our quantile reserves come into the category of contingency reserves. They are not certainly going to be needed, but they might be needed. That is the whole reason for having them.
We did not discuss with-profits business, because it is considerably more complicated. The way in which I would see a with-profits company working -imagine just a mutual company with no shareholders -is that there are various classes of with-profits business. That creates something of a problem, particularly with multi-national companies or with companies undertaking multiple classes of business. The with-profits policyholders start with the concept that they get the asset share, possibly smoothed in some way, plus the profits and minus the losses from the non-profit business. Guarantees are contributors to the non-profit part. The question then is: "Which category of with-profits policyholder is sharing the profits and the losses on the guarantees that are provided for some other category of with-profits policyholder?" It is not something that we wanted to get into in the paper, but it is something which I think that the profession needs to discuss quite considerably.
Unlike Mr Smith, I do not believe that shareholders are willing to take extra risks, even if the results were uncorrelated, independent of their other risks, without some extra reward. I do not think that it is just the deadweight charges. On the other hand, I take on the points of the opener that the profits and losses on GAOs may be negatively correlated profits and losses on other assets, and that may be beneficial. I agree that we should have thought of that.
Mr Smith also mentioned guarantees on with-profits policies, and why life offices did not consider them. I wrote a paper in 1986 on the subject (Wilkie, 1987) , but few appear to have read it, but no doubt by 2006 I will be writing a revised version of that one, too.
On methods of discounting reserves, the use of deflator methodology has been mentioned. I think that it is very important that you should look at what you are going to invest the reserves in. In the first part of the paper we assumed that the reserves were invested in shares, but, of course, when we are option pricing, the reserves are not necessarily invested in shares, or they are invested in shares plus and minus the other very important parts. As a small part in the discussion about option pricing, we mention two decision areas. One, since you are not matching the option exactly because of the hedging error that trickles in, how do you match up? Do you put the right amount in some assets and the balance in others, or do you split the proportions correctly? I have also done this with vanilla call options. The right thing for vanilla call options on shares is to put the right amount in shares and the balance in cash. That approach gives the lowest variance of hedging error. If you put the right amounts in the proportions for a call option, it can go extremely and badly wrong. If you have a contingency reserve in order to cover the hedging error, it is worthwhile working out how you invest that contingency reserve.
The answer, I would say, is to discount using all the different methods that you could use to discount, and choose the one that gives you the lowest variance. We did not do that in Section 2, although we could have done. The small advantage of what we have done is to make the algebra much easier, but that is not really an argument, because one can quite well do the simulations. It would be quite possible to do the simulations testing different ways of investing. Do we invest in the deferred life annuity? Do we invest in the zero-coupon bond? Do we invest in shares? And then we would see which one is the cheapest. On the other hand, if you want to bring in some dynamic structure, then do not bring it in here, bring it in with the option pricing.
As regards actual hedging, we did not much use the word 'swap', but a forward life annuity is simply a swap. 'Swap' is the name for a purchase of a forward bond, in effect, and a forward life annuity is the same as a swap, and an option on a forward life annuity is the same as a 'swaption'. We did not use that terminology, because it is no more coherent than ours.
A very important aspect is if life offices cannot do the hedging sensibly, and they may well be able to match their risks against other risks, then it may be worthwhile reinsuring with an investment bank, which may have a bigger pool of risks that can be offset one against another. However, can the investment bank actually invest long enough? If we are the actuary advising the investment bank that is doing what is really just reinsurance, we need to establish whether there are enough securities, the zero-coupon bonds, in the market. The term needs to be up to 95 years from now. I do not think that there are enough zero coupon bonds in the market, so I do not see why the ability of investment banks to match is better than some life offices' ability to match these GAOs. Moreover, their security may be no better than some of the unfortunate life offices about which we know.
I do not think that it is enough to say that we will get rid of life insurance business, as it were, by handing it all over to reinsurance, so that we can just act as brokers to the reinsurance companies. Also, I do not think that it is satisfactory to say that life offices can act just as brokers to investment banks. As actuaries, we have to look at where the buck stops, and to see it all the way through.
Some minor points on mortality. We say that actuaries did not do very well on forecasting. Since I was the one responsible for doing some of the forecasting, I think that I am allowed to place that criticism. It was me, to a great extent, that did the forecasting for the PA 90 tables, and I got that one wrong. It was not only me but I was partly involved in the 80 series forecasting, and mortality has done even better than that. What we have not done, and what we would like to do, is to start off in 1984 with our stochastic mortality model, and to see what would have happened. Just to clarify something on stochastic mortality, we do not mean the risks of small portfolios; we do mean the uncertainty about future mortality rates in aggregate.
I think that the lesson is that the costs in 1985 might not have been extremely big, and that life offices might have been quite happy to add these guaranteed annuities at earlier times for free. However, by 1985, if somebody had been doing their sums, they would have seen that quantile reserves were not trivial; 20% or so is not trivial. The costs might have been small, but quantile reserves were quite high, and during the 1980s and 1990s the quantile reserves would have been pushed up and up. That is both because of interest and because of changes in mortality. If it had been a pure non-profit office writing unit-linked policies with guarantees, and I do not know whether there were any such offices, the shareholders would have lost money. If it had been a with-profits office, then the losses would have appeared from year to year, the amount available for future bonus would have seemed smaller, and offices would have had to declare rather smaller bonuses during the 1980s and the 1990s to set up enough reserves. So, they would not have been so totally surprised by 1993 or, worse, 1997-98, that they would have said: "Oh dear, we thought we had reserved enough, which was nothing, and now we find that we have to reserve a lot." They would have been forewarned considerably.
The opener complained about the Wilkie model producing the problem of consols having a lower bound of 0.5%. However, we do say that it happens only for four individual years in 10,000 simulations of 40 years. That is four times in 400,000 years. I do not think that you are going to make much arbitrage opportunity out of that one.
We have used the Wilkie model and other things that were available at the time, not only because I have the programs to do it easily, but because that was what was published at the time. Yes, there have been other potentially better models produced, or more interesting models produced since then, but that would have involved another paper. Which is the right model? What happens if you use different models? Again, we mention in the paper that you should look at different models, and we would like to look at different models. It takes more time to do it, and we would have even more tables of numbers. 
E., F.F.A.):
This is an important paper, and the contributions to the discussion reflect that. I echo what has been said already; while it may look formidable, the paper is remarkably readable and digestible. For that we should be extremely grateful to the authors.
Mr Smith congratulated the Faculty on having the courage to allow the paper to be presented at a sessional meeting at a particularly sensitive time. I do not think that courage is required when the paper is a good one. Perhaps courage is needed to turn down a bad paper at a time of keen demand, but I think that this paper is timely, and the thinking behind it will, I suspect, be transferable well beyond the subject which it addresses -important though that subject is.
I note, in ¶12.12, that the authors have pointed out a number of further areas for work and research; and further areas beyond that have emerged in a number of the contributions to the discussion. I would like to encourage the authors to take their work forward. I am pleased that Professor Wilkie has already suggested that he might do so, and also that he might incorporate earlier work which he undertook more than ten years ago. More needs to be done, and its importance to the profession is beyond question.
To conclude a significant evening, I should like you to join me in thanking the authors -and I should particularly like to mention Dr Yang in her absence -for providing such a thought-provoking paper and for stimulating an excellent discussion.
WRITTEN CONTRIBUTIONS

Dr L. Ballotta and Professor S. Haberman, F.I.A.:
We thank the authors for their interesting paper and their thorough discussion of issues associated with GAOs. There is much in it that we welcome and with which we agree, but there are a few elements with which we take issue and it is these that we would particularly like to address in this contribution.
The first point concerns the authors' approach to the historical analysis of GAOs. They adopt the viewpoint of a hypothetical actuary in 1985, who is considering how to value such products. This hypothetical actuary is aware of the Wilkie model and the simulation work of the Maturity Guarantees Working Party (Ford et al., 1980) , but is ignorant of the then current financial economics literature on the valuation of guarantees and of the concept of noarbitrage (as this relates to the Wilkie model). In our view, this is a rather limiting perspective to adopt, especially when we come to consider modern methods for the valuation of GAOs.
Thus, by 1985 the option pricing methodology, or, generally speaking, contingent claim analysis, was fully formalised in both versions: the 'equilibrium' version, which leads to the construction of replicating portfolios and governing partial differential equations (based principally on the contributions of Black & Scholes, 1973; and Merton, 1973, 1974) , and the 'martingale' version (based principally on the contributions of Cox, Ross & Rubinstein, 1979; Harrison & Kreps, 1979; Harrison & Pliska, 1981 , 1983 . Extensions had been already explored, in particular the case of stochastic interest rates was considered by Merton (1973) and Vasicek (1977) , inter alia. We also note that the first major development of contingent claim analysis was the pricing of corporate liabilities, the reason being, as outlined by Merton (1998) , the unifying framework for valuing these liabilities provided by option pricing theory. An extensive list of references on this topic is contained in Merton (1977) ; amongst these we mention the contribution of Brennan & Schwartz (1976) and Boyle & Schwartz (1977) , who analyse the problem of an insurance company's guarantee of a minimum cash value for equity-linked life insurance policies. It is also worth noting that, in 1986, a paper appeared in the Journal of the Institute of Actuaries, exposing the option pricing approach to valuing such maturity guarantees (Beenstock & Brasse, 1986 ).
This brief review shows that, in the 1980s, the option pricing methodology was known and already 'at work'. We recognise that results for pricing coupon bond options and options on coupon bond-like products, such as GAOs, did not become available until the late 1980s (see, for example, Jamshidian, 1989); however, the knowledge available by 1985 would have allowed the construction of upper bounds to the value of GAO contracts.
Our second point concerns the GAO model presented in Section 10.2, where a mathematical model for the evolution of the price of a life annuity is proposed rather than a model for the underlying interest rates and their term structure. We believe that it would be more useful to model the fundamental quantities driving the life annuity value -an analogy would be the standard approach which is used to graduate the force of mortality, rather than, say, whole life insurance premiums.
Next we comment on ¶10.5.8, where the authors generously refer to our work (Belotta & Haberman, 2002) . In their review of our work, the authors make some comments which are unsubstantiated, and which, we believe, are misleading. Our results show similar features to those of the authors and Boyle & Hardy (2002), and so we are unclear what is specifically meant by the doubts about the plausibility of our results. Also, the authors seem to have misunderstood the nature of our term structure model for interest rates, and to have missed the point that we do, indeed, derive the hedging proportions.
Our fourth point concerns Section 11.3 on stochastic mortality rates. Here we would like to add to the authors' comments, and mention some of the interesting developments in the actuarial literature on modelling time trends in mortality and longevity risk (see Sithole et al., 2000; Milevsky & Promislow, 2001; Olivieri, 2001; Renshaw & Haberman, 2002a) and the developments based on the Lee-Carter framework (see Lee, 2000; Brouhns et al., 2002; Renshaw & Haberman, 2002b , 2003 .
We next turn to Appendix C. Regarding ¶C.1, some useful references for quanto options are Zhang, 1998, chapter 20 and Musiela & Rutkowski, 1998 , as well as the references cited therein. We believe that Appendix C would be more useful if a formal standard mathematical notation were adopted (as in most of the financial mathematics literature). This would help the interested reader in understanding the results and their validation, and would also provide a more solid link between this paper and the existing body of literature.
The general impression which we gain from reading Appendix C is that the description of the contingent claim pricing methodology, and, in particular, risk-neutral valuation, is neither accurate nor complete. For example, the reason why and the way in which the change of measure is carried out is very misleading. Also, the distinction between what the authors define as the 'real-world model' and the 'option-pricing model' is confusing. What the authors appear to have done is to compare two alternative approaches to model financial markets. One is based on the Wilkie model, and the other one on the geometric Brownian motion. Then they show how the two models can be used to price options and GAO contracts. In particular, they adopt risk neutral valuation in the geometric Brownian motion set up. It is worth mentioning, however, that stochastic scenario simulation models based on the geometric Brownian motion are also available in the literature (see, for example, Consiglio et al., 2000) .
The authors state, in ¶ ¶10.3.1 and 12.8, that, unless hedging can actually be carried out, theoretical option prices cannot be considered to be fair values, and consequently they are not of practical use. However, reducing option pricing theory to just hedging is quite inappropriate and very limiting. One of the main problems connected with GAOs, is that these contracts represent liabilities in the balance sheet, whose magnitude has been seriously underestimated. As mentioned before, contingent claim analysis provides a general framework for the valuation of the size of these liabilities and the risk exposure from these contracts; also, this framework is consistent with the market laws of demand and supply, in other words, with the theory of general equilibrium. The hedging problem is, in our opinion, a separate issue. It is true that the existence of a replicating portfolio and the satisfaction of the resulting partial differential equation implies implicitly that the contingent claim is hedgeable. However, this is only a theoretical hedgeability, which relies on the existence of infinitely divisible securities, continuous-time trading possibilities, and complete markets; i.e. securities with the required duration that are actively traded in the market. This is shown, above all, by the experience in exotic option markets and bond option markets. This is the reason why many contributions in the field are devoted to the study of alternative hedging strategies (for example, the static replication approach developed by Derman et al., 1994 Derman et al., , 1995 , which are, in many cases, ad hoc strategies.
Mr. D. O. Forfar, F.F.A.
I think that the approach and the content of the paper will be seen as being of great importance to the profession in future years.
The question of guarantees is of central importance to actuaries and life offices, particularly in today's climate, where guarantees that were previously 'out of the money' have now become 'in the money'. It would, I feel, be a retrograde step if the current fear of guarantees drove life offices to abandon guarantees to the investment banks (or only provide guarantees if the risk is reassured with an investment bank). On the contrary, there seems to be great scope for the profession to be seen to master the best 'financial engineering' techniques available, which enable the cost of guarantees/options to be analysed and their risk covered by hedging, to the extent possible for practical reasons, or appropriate reserving when hedging can only be undertaken to a limited extent for practical reasons.
Unit-linked policies with cash maturity guarantees.
The Maturity Guarantees Working Party (MGWP) (Ford et al., 1980) showed a way of holding enough guarantee reserves on unit-linked business with cash maturity guarantees (e.g. where a guaranteed investment return of 0% applied). The methodology proposed was to deal with all events, except, say, the one in 100 event, by holding initially sufficient guarantee reserves to cover, say, 99 out of 100 of initially likely future scenarios, which we shall call 'the 1% probability of ruin (PoR) guarantee reserve at the outset', because the size of the reserves depends on the initially prevailing conditions as well as the quantile selected. Under the close matching rules, the unit reserve has to be met by holding the unit reserves in units itself, but the guarantee reserve falls outside the close matching rules (see Article 23/4 of Third Life Directive).
As the authors point out, it is not as simple as setting the guarantee reserve initially and then forgetting about it. As time goes by financial conditions vary, and the question then arises: "Are the reserves to be calculated anew with the conditions prevailing today being treated as the new starting conditions (marking to market), or is the '1% PoR guarantee reserve at the outset' to be left unchanged unless it has gone out of range ('MGWP approach' had the range 98/100 to 99.9/100)?" I am an advocate of the 'marking to market' approach, as I think you need to do the calculations anyway to determine the new 2% PoR and 0.1% PoR guarantee reserves. If the marking to market approach is adopted, the new 1% PoR guarantee reserve would not necessarily be worse than the 1% PoR guarantee reserve at outset, even if financial conditions had changed for the worse since the policy's outset. The reason is that the initial 'funnel of doubt' would have narrowed, as the option was closer to maturity. Another way of saying this is that, even if the option had become more in-themoney, the standard deviation (volatility) of the option value can be expected to have gone down, as there is a shorter time to go and the new 1% PoR guarantee reserve would not necessarily be any higher than it was at the outset.
However, the size of the guarantee reserve depends crucially on the investment policy adopted in respect of the guarantee reserve. If the investment policy is: (1) to invest the guarantee reserves wholly in cash that is one thing; (2) if the investment policy for the guarantee reserves is 100% shares that is another thing; and (3) if the investment policy is to follow dynamic hedging, so far as practical constraints allow, that is another. There are thus three levels of guarantee reserves, all different, but they are designed to cover a 1% probability of ruin. I think it is important for the actuary to minimise the guarantee reserve required (at a given 'probability of ruin'), otherwise other institutions may give cheaper options and take the market away from the life companies. The question of the size of the 1% PoR guarantee reserve depending on the investment policy adopted for this reserve, has not, in my view, received sufficient attention by the profession, and I should be interested in the authors' views. It seems to have implications for the proposed International Accounting Standard for Insurers which is based on 'fair values' of liabilities having as close to the same meaning, internationally, as possible. However, if the 'fair value' of liabilities depends on the investment policy which is going to be adopted by the writer of the option, then this has implications for international comparability of 'fair values'. Despite these problems, I should mention that I am very much in favour of the actuary having to make the most realistic assessment of the value of his liabilities (both guaranteed and non-guaranteed, dictated by PRE) that he can using the latest actuarial techniques. The current Regulations regarding the value of liabilities to be included in the Statutory Returns and the Statutory Accounts are recognised as being out of date.
It is a sign of the times that the 1980 Maturity Guarantees Working Party (MGWP) (Ford et al., 1980) used the word 'immunisation' to describe the alternative approach which we would now call 'hedging'. Indeed, the 1980 Working Party concluded in ¶6.7: "…..although the Working Party did not pursue immunisation theory, it concluded that it was a subject which merits further investigation. ….the Working Party considers that there is no basis for reducing reserves because a company follows some form of immunisation." The theory of dynamic hedging, giving a unique price for call/put options, was then just starting to be in wider use, although Black & Scholes and Merton had written their famous Nobel Prize winning papers some seven years earlier, in 1973. The MGWP conclusion, that hedging did not reduce guarantee reserves, would be called into question today. With theoretical hedging, albeit not possible in practice, all the quantiles around the mean (the Black-Scholes theoretical cost of the option) collapse, and the right price for the option, combined with dynamic hedging, means that there is no risk to the office (the reserve would always equal the self-financing value of the option with no variance).
Looking at maturity guarantees on unit-linked business in terms of options is to say that the guarantee reserve represents a put option. The put option needs to be paid for and the option premium invested. The option may be perfectly dynamically hedged by investing in a cash account or a zero-coupon bond and borrowing shares (these borrowings being repaid according to how the shares perform). The MGWP pointed out there are practical difficulties with dynamic hedging. The practical difficulties with the theory that the 1980 Working Party identified were: (1) investment decisions cannot be instantaneously and continuously implemented in any quantities; (2) transaction costs are not zero. To this can be added (3) the fact that the Black-Scholes price is only correct for stochastic processes following geometric Brownian motion (which leads to the log of the yearly percentage movement of the share price having a normal distribution), but we know that the skewness (-0.2 from the Barclays Equity/Gilt Study) and kurtosis (4.5 from the same study) of the distribution of the log of the percentage movement in the share price over a year is far from the skewness (0) and kurtosis (3) of a normal distribution.
These remain practical difficulties today, but hedging can make a dramatic difference in reducing the 1% PoR guarantee reserves which require to be held for these guarantees/options.
One can see that the uncertain volatility of share prices (the volatility of which has gone up very markedly in recent months) makes it rather dangerous to write put options with a maturity 15-20 years in the future, but writing put options with a maturity of up to five years seems acceptable. One may ask why the 'financial engineering' of the investment banks cannot be directly replicated in the life offices. Things have moved on since the 1980s and actuaries are more familiar now with financial economics and dynamic hedging, thereby reducing the level of reserves previously required without hedging.
In comparing Tables 2.5.1 with Table 10.4.2 in the paper one can see that Q 99 for an annuity guarantee has gone down at terms {10,20,30,40} from {8,15,21,24} to {1,2,3,2}, a dramatic reduction.
Unit-linked business with guaranteed minimum annuity rates
The authors have applied the same technique to the guarantee reserving for unitlinked business with guaranteed minimum annuity rates at maturity, where the office has written a quanto option. The Regulator, in his 1998 official Treasury letter, and the Actuarial Profession in their 1999 Position Statement, had assumed that many with-profits policies with annuity guarantees were lawfully different from quanto options, as the authors point out in ¶2.2.7. The House of Lords have ruled otherwise. If the Regulator feels, with justification, that he has interpreted the law up to that time correctly, and has safeguarded policyholders' reasonable expectations and the solvency of a company, there seems a danger of bringing the regulatory system into disrepute, if a company can be solvent one minute and made insolvent the next by an unexpected judgment.
For unit-linked policies with guaranteed minimum annuity rates, the 'perfect' hedge requires investment of the option premium in the unit-linked fund, together with investing in a deferred cash flow payable (after deferment) for 25 years, and borrowing zero-coupon bonds with redemption at age 65 to fund the deferred cash flow (making the simplifying assumption that everyone will retire at 65, live for 25 years, and then die). It will be immediately seen that several more practical difficulties appear if the guaranteed payments are annuities and not cash: (4) it may not be possible to buy the deferred cash flow because the gilt/strip market may not go out long enough; (5) increasing longevity may mean that the deferred cash flow bought proves not to be long enough; and (6) the strips market is a comparative development of recent years. It is clear that in the 1980s the only approach to unit-linked business with guaranteed minimum annuity rates was 'x% PoR guarantee reserving'. The swaptions market and the strip market are of relatively recent origin, and while swaptions help with hedging quanto options, they do not address the issue of the 'quantum' of the option being dependent on fund performance or the issue of increasing longevity. It should also be borne in mind that the annuities will commence at different times in the future (the selected pension ages) and decline as annuitants die off.
Some rough calculations show that even reserving at the 1% PoR level, guarantee reserves at the outset would hardly have covered the cost which emerged (because of the fall in interest rates and increasing longevity, assuming that the unit fund movements are eliminated by investing the option premium in the unit-fund). Such considerations say something about the level of reserving required if the reserves are to be self-financing which in one of the principles of reserving for unit-linked policies. The shareholders, estate or other policyholders have lost out heavily on the options to the tune of some 30-40% of the single premiums paid by policyholders, because they have had to finance the emerging cost. The beauty of with-profits was that there was thought to be some flexibility in the terminal bonus, but this flexibility now seems to have been taken away.
In Section 2.2 the authors refer to the alternative of taking, under the open market option (OMO), the maturity proceeds as a cash amount without the value of the guarantee (if it bites), but they do not reduce the value of the guarantee for the proportion taking the OMO. Presumably the reason for this was that policyholders' reasonable expectations and the original purpose for which an OMO was designed (competition on annuity rates) would dictate that the OMO is the maturity proceeds plus the value of the guarantee (if any).
Mortality
The authors bring out very clearly the improvements in longevity that have taken place. The improvements in mortality at younger ages (at age 40, AM92 at 9.37 per 10,000 was some 18% better than AM80 at 11.41 per 10,000) would have gone some way to hedge improvements in longevity. As one of those, along with Professor McCutcheon and Professor Wilkie, responsible for the mortality improvements factors in CMIR 17, I am aware of the risks of predicting future improvements, only to find that in a few years mortality has improved at a rate faster than one had thought possible! However, of the (approximately) 30% decline below the typical guaranteed annuity rate at age 65 (of 11.11%p.a.) roughly 10% is due to mortality improvements and 20% through reductions in interest rates. It will be seen, therefore, that the reduction in interest rates has been the more important factor in the ratio of approximately 2:1.
Cost of the option and hedging the option investments and borrowings
The theoretical price of an option is given in ¶ ¶10.2.7 and C.9.14, which are very interesting. The share (S), deferred annuity (D) and zero coupon bond (P) prices, as well as the prices of the first two assets relative to the third are all assumed to be lognormal, so their logarithms are normal irrespective of the measure used. The option can be constructed, without any risk, out of a portfolio of these three assets. The value of this portfolio (for which no new money is ever required theoretically) gives the value of the option at all times, and the continuously changing proportions of the assets in the portfolio gives the dynamic hedging investment strategy, as Black-Scholes-Merton showed. The asset F is the annuity bought forward (i.e. the agreement to purchase is signed and the payment, delayed until vesting, agreed) and D(t)=P(t)F(t). I think that the derivation of the option cost can be simplified with the aid of two lemmas from statistics, as shown below.
If the asset P is chosen as the numeraire (the asset with respect to which the relative prices are calculated) then the measure is chosen with respect to which these relative prices are martingales:
The pay-off from the option under the real world probabilities is and the price of the option is where E M is the expectation under the 'forward' measure.
I use the notation ~A to mean 'is distributed as A under the forward measure, apart from the mean' and A#B to mean 'covariance of A and B ' and (Y-K) + to mean 'if (Y-K) positive'. Note that, in distinction to the Paper, P(t) is used for the price of a zero coupon bond at time t (maturing at time T), as the notation B(t) usually refers to a cash account.
The lemmas (easily proved) from statistics are that if X and Y are log-normal and correlated then:
Using the formula above, assuming the values for (the value 8.407 corresponding to an annuity certain for 15 years yearly in advance at 9.9%, the Consol's yield in 1984, and the other parameters are derived from the Barclays gilt/equity study). Table 2 .5.1 of the paper. It will be seen that the average cost in Table  2 .5.1 is much lower than the Formula cost. In trying to explain the differences, I ran 1,000 simulations of the 1984 Wilkie model (full standard basis, starting conditions as in 1984), and derived the average option costs, which are very small and the same order of magnitude as the average costs in Table 2 .5.1.
The variances and covariances under the 'forward measure' of the relative prices are derived as follows:
The value of the option follows immediately from the above Lemmas:
Since there is some evidence that the volatility of the spot rate R(t) increases as the corresponding ZCB gets shorter, it may be more realistic to take
Term
Formula option cost (as above)
Mean option cost ( The hedging proportions are easily found from the formula for the price of the option by differentiating partially with respect to the assets S, D and P, i.e. by calculating (i.e. varying one asset at a time). The portfolio for the option premium is therefore a value of V(t) in the unit-linked fund (S), a value of in the deferred annuity asset (D), having borrowed exactly the same amount in the zero coupon bonds (P) to fund the deferred annuity asset. The value of the whole portfolio is V(t).
As the cost of the option depends on the slope of the yield curve as well as its level, a one-factor model (like the Ho and Lee or Vasicek models where the forward rates are perfectly correlated and there is no mean reversion (Ho and Lee) or exact fit to the actual yield curve (Vasicek)) does not seem so suitable.
Hedging Portfolio
Theoretically, the option can be hedged by issuing (going short of) zero-coupon bonds of the maturity which matches the selected pension age, but the theoretical hedging portfolio is somewhat peculiar, as Table D.1.1 shows (the single premium is £100, the option cost is £8, and it requires a short position of £52 in the ZCB and a long position of £52 in the deferred annuity, with the position being constantly adjusted throughout the life of the option!). In practical terms, the life offices can only easily borrow flexibly at the short rate.
I examined the volatilities and correlations emerging, because the cost of these options is very dependent on these volatilities and correlations.
Unless I have done something wrong, the values that I obtained from the Wilkie Model for the parameters at ten years (for the ten-year option were {.25, .03, 0.15, 0.10}, and we can assume the value for Feeding these adjusted parameters into the formula gives the final column of Table D.1.2, and is of the same order of magnitude as the mean cost in the paper.
My observations are therefore:- (1) It is not clear why the option costs in Table 2 .5.1 are low in comparison to the formula costs with parameters derived from the Barclays gilt/equity study (the formula costs are comparable with Table 2 .5.1, since they assume that a person aged 65 lives for 15 years, as does PMA68U1985).
(2) Is it possible that the reason is that the 1984 model produces a lower volatility (than the Barclays gilt/equity study) of the forward annuity and of the correlation between shares and forward annuities (higher values of both contribute to higher option costs)?
In practical terms the life office can only borrow flexibly at the short rate, and the correlation between the change in the natural logarithm of the forward F and the change in the short rate may be only around -0.35.
Using this value for ρ FR , but otherwise the original formula parameters unchanged, has a significant effect on the option cost, as shown in Table D Other practical considerations are very important, and are covered in (1) to (5) above, and it should, additionally, be noted that there is no hedge for longevity (apart from the mortality improvements at young ages).
Conclusion
The paper has great importance for actuaries. Let us hope that actuaries will again take centre stage over what is possible, in practice, to write as guarantees, knowing that they have mastered the latest financial engineering techniques for analysing the costs, the reserving for, and the controlling of, these risks.
The authors subsequently wrote: Many speakers in the discussion made points with which we agree. We thank them, but we do not comment further on the points. Some made points which were replied to by Professor Wilkie in his oral reply to the discussion. We do not comment further on most of these either. However, there are some points that require further elucidation. Also, two written contributions have been received, from Dr Ballotta and Professor Haberman (B&H) and from Mr Forfar. These require some reply.
In ¶3.2.8 we wrote: "We conclude that the levels of α and h remain a matter for the judgement of the management or the directors of the particular company writing the business." The opener suggested that this was an 'unsatisfactory conclusion' and that it sounded to him "like a classic actuarial cop out for 'we don't know'". We do not agree. While we are in favour of using scientific methods as far as possible in helping the making of decisions rationally, there always remain final decisions which are properly matters of judgement. If, for example, one uses the concept of a utility function for making decisions, the values of that function or of its parameters remain a matter for the choice or judgement of the decision maker. If one chooses to accept or reject some hypothesis on the basis of some statistical test, it remains a matter of judgement whether one does so at a 5% level, at a 1% level, or at some other probability level. Such examples abound in every decision that we choose to make.
In the case in question, it is matter for the judgement of the decision maker (directors or management of the company or possibly the supervisory authority) whether reserves at a 99% or at a 99.9% level, or at some other level, should be set up. No scientific reasoning, actuarial or otherwise, helps to make that decision, though illustrative examples may help. For example, if all life offices were required to reserve on the basis of having sufficient assets in total to meet their liabilities one year ahead with a probability of 95%, then 5% of them might not be able to. Many people would be persuaded that for 5% of life offices to become insolvent within a year was too great a risk, and that some higher standard should be used. However, whether this should be such that the probability is reduced to 1 in 100 or 1 in 1,000 or 1 in 10,000 has to remain a matter of judgement. Against the advantages of greater security should be set the disadvantages of greater capital requirements for life offices, restrictions on entry to the market, greater cost to policyholders, and so on. Deciding on a trade-off between these factors will always remain a matter of judgement, and to state this is not an 'actuarial cop out'.
The opener is unhappy about our "setting the charge to the policyholder as the discounted value of the benefit from the guarantee." Further, we discount at the rate of return on the share (or other) portfolio. We do this in the early sections of the paper, because we do not use option pricing methodology at this stage, and we assume that the reserves are invested in the same portfolio as that to which the policyholder's investment is linked.
There is a general point here, which is worth expanding. We believe, and we use this principle throughout the paper, that, in order to assess the value of a non-tradeable liability, one should consider the value of those tradeable assets that could be used to match the liability. If there is a choice of assets, one should discover those assets that match most closely. If a perfect match can be found, which could, in fact, be invested in, then the value of the liabilities can be taken as equal to the value of the matching assets. That perfect match may require a static hedge, as a dedicated bond portfolio matching a portfolio of vested annuities, or it may require dynamic hedging, as in most option pricing models. If a perfect match cannot be found, then one has to use the best available match. What we choose as 'best' is now a matter of judgement. We would like a low mean value and a low variance about that value. These may be combined into a low value for some extreme quantile.
In the particular case in question, in ¶2.3.6 we stated: "It would have seemed correct in 1985 for those reserves to have been invested in shares, because this would most tidily match the amount of the liability"; but we had not investigated this. Alternatives would have been to invest in a zero-coupon bond maturing at time T, or a deferred annuity commencing at time T, or in some static mixture of these; we would have left dynamic hedging to Section 10. We have investigated this. The results are mixed. In 1985 we would have had the results shown in Table D In that case investing the reserves in the zero-coupon bond or the deferred annuity would have been cheaper on almost all measures than investment in shares, though Q 99.9 for the bond is higher than that for shares; but investment in the hedging portfolio would have been better still. However, if we move forward to the last comparable results as in Tables 6.4r, 10.4.8 and 10.4.9 we would have come to a different conclusion, as shown in Table  D Investment of the contingency reserves in a bond or a deferred annuity would now have been very much more expensive, and, as we had already noted in ¶10.4.9, hedging may result in higher charges than investment of the reserves in shares. Thus, the question of how to invest the contingency reserves deserves investigation on each occasion, and it may, indeed, be better to continue investigating through the term of the contract.
As a further example, it is worth exploring the opener's one-year at-the-money option on a share. Assume an asset with a constant risk-free rate (force) of interest of 5%, so δ = 0.05. Assume geometric Brownian motion for the share price, S(t), so that:
dS(t) = µS(t).dt + σ.S(t).dZ
with σ = 0.2 and µ (initially) = 0.07. Put S(0) =100 and K, the exercise price, also = 100. Put T = 1 year. Then the payoff from a European call option at T is (S(T) -K) + , i.e. S(T) -K if S(T) > K and 0 otherwise. Likewise the payoff from a European put option is (K -S(T)) + .
Assume that we have written such options and decide to try to meet the liability: (a) by investing wholly in the share; (b) by investing wholly in the risk-free asset; and (c) by investing in the correct hedging proportions, continuously and costlessly, throughout. Thus we discount at the rate earned on the assumed 'matching' asset.
Then we can calculate the probability that the payoff is non-zero, and we can calculate the mean, standard deviation and selected quantiles of the payoff. We can also calculate the mean, standard deviation and selected quantiles of the initial investment required for each of our investment policies. We can calculate all of these analytically.
For the call option we find the probability of a non-zero payoff to be 0.64 and the other results to be: The fact that the means are the same for share and hedging is an accident, and happens because µ = δ + ½σ 2 . The standard deviation is not the best measure for a very skew distribution, but for the hedging strategy it is zero, because the theoretical hedging strategy exactly meets the payoff (and a practicable investment strategy has small hedging error, if we ignore transaction costs). However, we see that investing wholly in the share would be cheaper for the call than investing wholly in the risk-free asset.
For the put option we find the probability of a non-zero payoff to be 0.36, the complement of the probability for a call, and the other results to be: Now the risk-free strategy is cheaper than investing in the share or in the hedging strategy; but the hedging strategy is certain whereas the others are not. It is the certainty of the hedging strategy that makes it the 'right' price, not its cheapness.
If we increase µ to the very much higher value of 0.22, so that shares are expected to rise greatly we get the respective probabilities of the call and put being in the money at expiry as 0.86 and 0.14 and statistics, for the call It is now, on average, much cheaper to invest in either the share or the risk-free asset than to hedge, but it runs the chance of being much more expensive
If we change µ in the opposite direction to -0.08, so that shares are expected to do quite badly, we get the respective probabilities of the call and put being in the money at expiry as 0.34 and 0.66 and statistics, for the call: It is now clearly better to use the hedging strategy.
Note that the hedging price is the same, regardless of what view one takes about the value of µ. This is another good reason for its being the right market price.
The expected returns to the purchaser of the option are the same as the expected costs to the writer, depending on the numeraire he chooses to use, e.g. shares or the riskfree asset; but if the purchaser expects shares to rise, calls are very good value, in terms of expected values, and puts are expensive; the situation is reversed if he expects shares to fall. Even if the expected value is favourable, a purchased option is a risky asset, and the chances of a nil payoff are not negligible. If the purchaser is himself hedging another part of his portfolio, that is a different matter.
This lengthy discursion may explain Mr Smith's problem. He compares Tables 6.4r and 10.4.9, and observes that the mean costs of providing the same benefits are different. The difference lies in the way that the provider chooses to invest to meet the liability. Although the final payoffs are the same, the distributions of the amount of assets that would need to be held initially to match the liability are different, with different means. In many cases, put options (which is essentially what GAOs are) are expensive to hedge, i.e. have a higher mean cost, as we have just shown, but they can be hedged with certainty. We have no doubt that hedging is the right strategy for dealing with options, if it is feasible in practice. That is why we wrote Section 10 and Appendix C.
The opener and Mr Smith seem to hold the view that, just as there is one observable market value for traded assets (subject to small errors of bid/offer spread, timing, etc), so there should also be a unique value for non-traded and non-tradeable liabilities. We do not believe this to be the case, and our whole paper is premised on what to us is the obvious fact that the cost of financial liability depends on what one can practicably invest in to meet it.
We repeat that we do not think that deflators do the job. They are no more than an alternative way of calculating option prices, assuming that hedging is possible, as an alternative to the equivalent martingale method. They are not a way of calculating the values of unhedgeable cash flows. However, we would welcome a sessional meetings paper on deflators, in which their rationale, construction and application could be explained, and their strengths and weaknesses discussed.
Mr Smith argues that "Deflator techniques cause the value of the cash flow to depend on the risk characteristics of that cash flow, not on arbitrary assumptions about future investment strategies to finance the cash flow." We do not believe that the two can be divorced. Consider any future cash flow. As far as the creditor is concerned, its value as an asset depends, not only on the definition, and hence the risk characteristics, of that cash flow, but also on whether the debtor will be able to pay it; if the debtor has no assets that will provide the cash flow, his promise to pay may be worthless. As far as the debtor is concerned, if he has undertaken a liability to provide a cash flow, he has to consider how he will meet it. The investments that he may make now, whether in shares, bonds, or in some hedging strategy, will, in fact, result in different cash flows with which to meet the liability. How he finances the liability, therefore, does affect the amount that he has to set aside now to meet it, which is the present value to him of that liability. We do not live in an abstract world in which all debtors have unlimited resources.
The opener makes a good point that, since the costs of GAOs are positively correlated with the returns on long-term bonds, the shareholders of a life office which invests in such bonds may be happier to provide them because of this diversification. Likewise, the costs of GAOs of the type that we describe rise as share prices rise, and the same arguments apply. This would justify using a lower rate for h.
The opener is concerned that the autoregressive nature of the (Wilkie) model understates the probability of the option ending in the money, presumably as compared with some other model that allowed interest rates to fluctuate more widely; but we know of no serious interest rate model that does not have some mean reversion. Further, the mean reversion does not affect the hedging quantities at all, though it may have some effect on the hedging error.
The opener also suggests that we could have investigated the use of 'swaptions' and other instruments available in the market. We explain, in Section 10.7, that we consider this equivalent to reassurance, in which the problem of how to hedge is just passed on. Actuaries need to consider the end of the process. How, given the real securities (not derivatives) in the market, can anyone hedge?
Mr Eastwood points out the restrictions that may be imposed in life offices through the 'close matching' requirements. This is another reason, in addition to those we have listed in Section 10.7, for reassurance with an institution that is not so restricted.
Mr Barton chooses to use the term 'contingency reserves' in a rather narrower way than we do. We have implicitly defined three concepts: first, 'best estimate', which is the mean (or perhaps median) expected result; secondly, 'fair value', which is the best estimate plus an allowance for the fact that insurers need to put up extra reserves; thirdly, 'prudent reserves' which may be calculated as quantile reserves or CTE reserves or in some other way, allowing for all the uncertainties that one wishes to include. Accountants seem to wish to call the first two of these 'provisions', because they will almost certainly be required, and they denote the extra amount to make up to the third as 'reserves', because they only might be needed. We use the term 'contingency reserves' almost synonymously with the accountant's 'reserves'; but none are precisely defined.
Mr Barton wonders who should put up the capital in a proprietary office, e.g. a typical '90/10' one. We would assume that 90% of any risk is borne by the with-profits policyholders, 10% by the shareholders, as with most other risks, and capital is provided in the same proportions.
The closer comments that in Table 2 .5.1 (and other similar tables) the 'Portfolio' line and the 'Sum' line are similar; but our point is that they are not equal. Q 99.9 for the Portfolio is 20.95 and for the 'Sum' is 29.84. In this case the quantile reserves required are reduced by almost one third, because of the spread of maturity dates. We do, indeed, get some benefit from diversification, but because the results for neighbouring years are correlated, and there are not many years, the benefit is not as much as it would be if there were very many years and their results were wholly independent. This is not because of autocorrelation; a random walk for interest rates would have a similar (but quantitatively different) effect.
We agree with the closer that risk-based capital should be calculated on an office-wide basis, and not on a product or single policy level, but it may be very difficult to calculate on a fully realistic office-wide basis. A practical way, an extension of what we suggest in Section 3.3 for single policies, might be to choose three levels of security: one for the office (say 99.9%); one for the product portfolio (say 98%); one for the single policy (say 95%). If policies were then charged on a 95% basis, this might correspond with a portfolio reserve of 98%, and if portfolio reserves were calculated on this basis, they might correspond with an overall office reserve of 99.9%. The actual values should be chosen after investigating, with a suitably simplified model, the possible correspondences between the levels, as we do in Section 3.3.
The closer suggested that: "At the end of 1999, it would have seemed extremely unlikely that we would have three years of negative stock market returns". This is the sort of question that can readily be answered for any model by simulation. For this we have again used the Wilkie model, 1995 version, modified to use net dividend yields, and changing the value of YMU from 0.0375 to 0.03375. With initial conditions as at the end of 1999, the result of 10,000 simulations is that the probability of three successive years of negative share returns was 22.62%, whereas the probability of three successive years of positive returns was 1.01%. Three years earlier, at the end of 1996, the probabilities were 9.65% for three successive positives, 6.64% for three successive negatives. Three years later, at the end of 2002 we get 13.18% for three successive positives, 3.74% for three successive negatives. At the end of 2002 the chances of runs of five successive positives and negatives are 4.31% and 0.12%. None of these events is outside a 1 in 1,000 probability, and none should cause us too much surprise if they happen or happened. This is one of the advantages of simulation: the method does show that events that may seem improbable to the naïve observer may well happen. Even a random walk model would show somewhat similar results, though they would be the same from year to year. But surely it was not surprising to any informed observer at the end of 1999 that share prices had reached exceptionally high multiples of earnings or of dividends (hence low dividend yields), and some correction was to be expected.
While we thank Dr Ballotta & Professor Haberman for the useful references that they give, we do not agree that the hypothetical practising actuary of 1985 should have been familiar with all the academic literature of the time, any more than it would be reasonable to expect life office actuaries to have similar knowledge now. However, we would expect practising actuaries to be familiar with papers in the British actuarial journals of the date, and we would hope that academically-inclined actuaries continue to act as intermediaries, explaining the latest theoretical ideas in acceptable language to their practising colleagues. That is one reason for our producing the lengthy, but comprehensive, Appendix C.
However, in order to value GAOs of the type that we describe, one needs to understand 'quantos'. The earliest references given by B&H to quantos are dated 1998. The earliest reference we can find is a paper by Eric Reiner of 1992. Another early paper is Dravid, Richardson & Sun (1993) . We have not seen either of these papers. However, Baxter & Rennie (1995) explain the mathematics very satisfactorily.
B&H then state that it is more useful "to model the underlying interest rates and their term structure", rather than the forward life annuity directly. We do not disagree with this in principle, but in practice one has to compromise with what is tractable. Both B&H and Boyle & Hardy (2003) use single-factor interest rate models, so that, in effect, the zcb before maturity and the fla after it are perfectly correlated. In practice, although interest rates of different terms are closely correlated, the relationship is imperfect. We recognise this by using, in effect, a simple two-factor interest rate model. The correlation reduces the cost and the price of the option considerably, but assuming perfect correlation, i.e. putting ρ 12 = -1.0 instead of our -0.9 would reduce the price rather too much, though the difference is small.
To represent realistically real yield curves, a model with more than two factors is actually necessary. Whether three, four or more are necessary is still to be investigated. A multi-factor interest rate model, realistic enough to replicate real yield curves, and tractable enough to be used for option pricing, remains to be investigated, though the model of Cairns (1999) is very much in the right direction.
B&H say that their results are similar to those of Boyle & Hardy (2002) . Both papers are still in draft form. We await final versions of both, when proper comparisons can be made. However, at present B&H give the value of a 20-year option whereas Boyle & Hardy show the payoff from an option that has matured. The latter may have been (and was) zero, but the former cannot be.
B&H suggest that our notation in Appendix C is not standard. It is, as far as possible, identical with that used by Baxter & Rennie (1995) , except for denoting the equivalent martingale functions by an asterisk rather than by a subscript Q. We explain our reasons for this in ¶C.8.6.
We are sorry that B&H have not understood the difference that we make between a 'real world model' and an 'option pricing model'. There is a real 'real world', whose mathematical process, if it has any, is unknown. We can simulate it with a simulated real world model like the Wilkie model. In the real real world, investors use option pricing models to determine the prices of options and the initial hedge amounts. They then dynamically change the hedging amounts in an attempt to replicate the resulting payoff. The model that they use for hedging is not the real real world model, which no one knows, but it is the real real world in which they live, and in which they invest. We distinguish, we hope clearly, between the model used for calculating option prices and hedging amounts, as in Appendix C, and the simulated real world model, the Wilkie model with bridges for interpolation.
The difference between these models is very important. We consider it essential that any proposed option pricing model should be tested against some simulated real world model (perhaps more than one). In fact none of the authors referred to in Section 10.5 have done this, except for VBEM, who test their model against the actual history of ten years from 1988 to 1998 at monthly intervals.
B&H suggest that "reducing option pricing theory to just hedging is quite inappropriate and very limitative". They then go on to comment on practical alternative hedging strategies, which seems to agree with our point. However, we consider that the enthusiasm of some for the mathematics of option pricing has caused many to miss the essential point, which we repeat: dynamic hedging is simply one investment strategy (out of many possible ones), and it can be shown to be good at replicating option payoffs. If dynamic hedging is not possible, for whatever reason, then the mathematically modelled option prices have no practical application, and cannot be used for calculating 'fair values'. We have already shown how we approach the assessment of contingency reserves for non-traded liabilities, in terms of the assets that would need to be held to meet the liability with a sufficient degree of certainty, and the fair values are derived, in some way, from the distribution of market values of the necessary assets.
It is a mistake to use option pricing mathematics for the assessment of values of options for which no hedging strategy could exist; one example is an option to purchase one particular piece of property if some planning consent is obtained; it is just not hedgeable.
We welcome Mr Forfar's helpful comments. He asks why we get different values for the option pricing parameters from what he does. He uses: σ S = 0.25, σ F = 0.07, σ R =0.015, ρ SF = 0.58, ρ RF = -0.9. We used: σ S = 0.2, σ F = 0.03 (0.04), σ R =0.006 (0.01), ρ SF = 0.3 (0.2), ρ RF = -0.9 (the figures in parentheses are for the 1995 Wilkie model). Naturally we get different option prices.
We have approached the estimation of suitable parameters in a quite different way from Mr Forfar. He has used the Barclays Gilt/Equity study, which gives end-December values of the indices. We have started with the Wilkie model, both versions of which were based on end-June values of a rather different set of indices from the Barclays study. Also, we have access to monthly data for the same set of indices. We derived parameters for the bridging partly from the monthly data, partly from the theoretical equivalents of the Wilkie model. We then simulated the zero-coupon bonds and the forward life annuity values from the Wilkie model, and estimated appropriate parameters for them. We then tested our option pricing method against the simulated Wilkie model with bridges, and adjusted the option pricing parameters so that the resulting hedging error had a mean close to zero. This apparently laborious method, which involves quite a lot of judgement, is likely to produce different answers from some other method. This shows how delicate the estimation of parameters for option pricing can be.
